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This study examines the investment efficiency of private and public firms in Korea. Prior studies 
suggest that the investment efficiency of firms can change according to the companies' agency 
problem caused by the existence of information asymmetry. Moreover, they argue that there is less 
information asymmetry in private firms than in public firms, because the major investors of 
private firms have access to the internal information of the companies. We extend these studies by 
comparing the investment efficiency of private and public firms using an extended audited 
financial dataset of Korean firms. Our results show that the investment efficiency of private firms 
is higher than that of public firms, because the agency problem of the former is lower than that of 
the latter. Additionally, private firms invest more efficiently in R&D and capital expenditures than 
public firms. Further, when we use alternative exogenous firm-specific proxies to measure the 
likelihood of over or under-investment, the results are substantially consistent with the main 
results. Finally, we re-test our hypotheses by including financial reporting quality proxies as 
control variables in the main regression model. These investigations further support our main 
results. Our study contributes to emerging literature on the difference between private and public 
firms by showing that the investment efficiency of the former is different from that of the latter. In 
addition, this study provides additional evidence on the agency problem that affects firms' 
investment decisions. 
 





his study investigates the investment efficiency of private and public firms in Korea. Prior research 
has observed that investment efficiency could be affected by the agency problem caused by 
information asymmetry between managers and outside suppliers of capital (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Myers, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Stein, 2003; McNichols and Stubben, 2008). In addition, Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) and other studies argue that there is less information asymmetry in private firms than in public 
firms, because the former are more closely managed by shareholders and the major investors have access to the 
internal information of the companies (Beatty and Harris, 1998; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Burgstahler et al., 
2006; Chen et al., 2011). According to these studies, we can expect the investment efficiency of private firms to be 
different from public firms. However, the influence of private ownership has been studied in limited contexts 
because financial data of private firms is not generally published (Givoly et al. 2010; Hope et al. 2013). Our study 
compares the investment behavior of Korean private and public firms using their extended audited financial dataset.  
 
Prior studies show that publicly traded firms are different from private firms in several aspects, including 
ownership structure, and governance mechanism (Beatty and Harris, 1998; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Chen et al., 
2011). In public firms, ownership and control must be separated as outside investors, who are not interested in 
management of the firms, hold majority of the company’s shares. In this case, an agency problem can arise due to 
information asymmetry between the outside investors and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). On the contrary, 
private firms are more likely to resolve the agency problem because the major investors, who often manage their 
own firms, have access to internal corporate information (Beatty and Harris, 1998; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; 
Burgstahler et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2011). Further, private firms have highly concentrated ownership, with the 
T 
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lower shareholder turnover leading to higher monitoring of the top management by the owners, compared to public 
firms(and Shivakumar, 2005; Chen et al., 2011). 
 
The literature also provides evidence suggesting that the information asymmetry between managers and 
outside capital providers can affect investment efficiency (Biddle et al. 2009; Cheng et al., 2013). Cheng et al.(2013) 
argue that moral hazard could provide managers with incentive to over-invest in order to maximize their own 
interests(Jensen, 1986; Stein, 2003). Under adverse selection, managers who are better informed than outside 
investors about the true value of firms are likely to sell overpriced shares. If they are successful, they may over-
invest these proceeds (Biddle et al., 2009; Cheng et al., 2013). However, managers tend to under-invest if the cost of 
capital increases after rational investors anticipate the managers' intention to issue overpriced shares(Biddle et al., 
2009; Cheng et al., 2013). These studies show that information asymmetry between managers and investors can 
result in over/ under-investment, thereby reducing investment efficiency.  
 
According to previous studies, private firms, on average, have lower information asymmetry than public 
firms. Agency problems caused by this asymmetry induces firms to make inefficient investment decisions. 
Combining these findings from prior research, we conjecture that the level of information asymmetry has varying 
effects on the investment efficiency of private and public firms. However, most studies on corporate investment are 
based on evidence from public firms, because the accounting data of private firms is not easily available to the 
public. In this paper, we examine whether private firms invest more efficiently than publicly traded firms using a 
large dataset Korean firms. Therefore, we hypothesize that the investment efficiency of private firms is higher than 
that of public firms.  
 
Korean financial reporting regulations provide ideal settings to compare private and public firms. First, the 
financial reporting and auditing regulations are equivalent for all public and private firms whose total assets exceed 
10 million US dollars. According to the Korean Act on External Audit of Stock Companies, both public and private 
firms are required to submit their audit reports, including their ownership structure, that are available to users on 
their web site to the Financial Supervisory Commission. Finally, private and public firms are subject to the same tax 
laws. Korea, therefore, provides an opportunity to investigate the effect of ownership structure of companies.  
 
Following Lawrence et al.(2011), we employ a propensity-score matching method to control for the 
differences in firm-specific characteristics between the private and public firms over the period 2004 to 2011. This 
procedure provides a public firm-year control sample that has similar characteristics to the private firm’s sample, but 
has a different level of ownership structure and investment efficiency (Armstrong et al. 2010).  
 
The empirical findings of the study are as follows. First, as hypothesized by us, private firms show higher 
investment efficiency than public firms, implying that information asymmetry can be mitigated in private firms, 
because investors play an instrumental role in the management of these firms and have more insider access to 
corporate information than in public companies. Robustness checks show that private firms invest more efficiently 
in R&D and capital expenditures than public firms. Further, private firms are less likely to invest when aggregate 
investment is high and more likely to invest when aggregate investment is low. This finding suggests that the 
privately owned firms are less affected by aggregate macro-economic volatility than public firms. Finally, we find 
that the main result does not change significantly after controlling for earnings quality in the model.  
 
Our study makes the following contributions. First, this study extends prior research on the economically 
important differences of privately owned companies and publicly traded firms. Prior studies provide evidence that 
private equity firms have a different level of financial reporting quality than public equity firms, using a limited 
firm-year sample (Givoly et al. 2010; Beatty et al., 2002). However, we compare the investment behavior of private 
and public firms and suggest that the investment efficiency of private firms is higher than that of public firms using 
large audited financial data of Korean firms.  
 
Second, this study provides additional evidence on the agency perspectives that affect investment 
efficiency. Cheng et al. (2013) suggest that financial reporting quality reduces agency costs, eventually leading firms 
to invest efficiently, using a sample of firms that disclosed internal control weakness (ICW) under the Sarbanes-
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Oxley Act. Using large audited financial data of private and public companies in Korea, this study provides further 
evidence that the agency problem caused by information asymmetry leads to inefficient investment. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and develops 
the testable hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the research design. Section 4 presents the empirical results of the study. 
Finally, section 5 concludes the study. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
2.1 Privately Held Firms Versus Publicly Traded Firms 
 
Private firms have not been widely studied by researchers theoretically and empirically, although they form 
a substantial part of the global economy and the market demand for their financial reporting quality is substantially 
different from that for public companies’ reporting quality(Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Hope et al., 2013). Several 
researchers have been interested in the characteristics of private firms that are likely to list their stocks on the 
market. More recently, several others have also compared the financial reporting qualities of private and public 
companies (Welch, 1989; Teoh et al., 1998; Beatty et al., 2002; Givoly et al., 2010; Hope et al., 2013). Nevertheless, 
the private firms have received limited attention in academic research, especially in the study of their investment 
behavior.  
 
Prior research argues that the agency problem caused by information asymmetry could be lower for private 
firms than for public firms (Beatty and Harris, 1998; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Chen et 
al., 2011). In public firms, ownership is usually dispersed, with managers separately controlling the companies. In 
such case, agency costs are incurred because managers seek their own interests and outsider investors fail to monitor 
the management adequately (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Additionally, the liquidity of public firms makes it easy 
for shareholders to sell their stock at the first sign of financial difficulties rather than actively monitoring 
management. This weakens incentives for internal monitoring and increases the agency problem (Bhide, 1993).  
 
On the contrary, private companies are usually more closely held, and stockholders of the firms play an 
important role in management, leading to stricter monitoring of the managers (Ball and Shivakumar,2005). 
Furthermore, the firms are more likely to access informal internal information when contracting with other parties, 
rather than using public financial statements. Therefore, private companies can reduce information asymmetry 
between managers and investors by providing insider access (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005).  
 
According to previous studies, the accounting literature has compared the financial reporting qualities of 
private and public companies (Beatty et al., 2002; Givoly et al., 2010; Hope et al., 2013). Beatty et al. (2002) 
suggest that public banks have more incentives to manipulate earnings because their shareholders are more likely to 
rely on earnings-based financial data to evaluate the firms’ performance. Givoly et al. (2010) provide evidence that 
privately owned firms have higher accrual quality and lower income management than public companies. This is 
because the managers of public firms have greater incentive to manage earnings than those of private equity firms. 
On the other hand, Hope et al. (2013) find that public companies report higher accrual quality to meet the capital 
market demand, even though they create information asymmetry because of ownership dispersion and owner-
manager separation. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) also show that the financial reporting quality of public companies 
is higher because they have a different market demand from private companies, as measured by timely loss 
recognition and accrual-based methods.  
 
Previous research provides mixed results for the financial reporting quality of public and private firms. 
However, it is difficult to compare the current results because most of these studies use either small samples or 
limited samples including specialized industries, such as banking or private firms that issue public debt. On the 
contrary, Korean public and private firms whose total assets exceed 10 million US dollars are expected to file 
audited financial reports according to the same financial reporting and auditing regulations. Additionally, all firms 
have to file tax reports to the National Tax Service following the same tax laws. Therefore, the Korean sample 
provides an opportunity to examine the association between private and public companies.  
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2.2 Agency Problem and Investment Efficiency  
 
Cheng et al. (2013) argue that information asymmetry between managers and shareholders can result in 
adverse selection and moral hazard, affecting the optimal investment decisions of companies (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Myers, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Stein, 2003; Biddle et al., 2009). Under adverse selection, managers 
who are better informed of the true value of their companies than outside investors can issue new stocks when the 
companies are overvalued. If investors do not monitor the manager’s behavior, they can over-invest these proceeds 
(Biddle et al., 2009; Cheng et al., 2013). On the other hand, if outside investors respond rationally, thereby 
increasing the cost of capital, managers can refuse to raise the funds, eventually leading to under-investment.  
 
Moreover, models of moral hazard suggest that managers are likely to maximize their own interests and 
may be inclined to make sub-optimal investment decisions. For example, Jensen (1986) proposes that managers 
have perquisite consumption and motivation to expand their firms beyond the optimal level. The managers are likely 
to provide upward-biased information to the board for approval of their investment plans. Thus, under moral hazard, 
firms with sufficient resources can over-invest. On the contrary, companies whose outside investors recognize the 
managers' behavior reject the investment plan, which may lead to under-investment ex-post (Biddle et al., 2009; 
Cheng et al., 2013). 
 
Several recent studies have empirically examined investment decisions based on the agency approach. 
Richardson(2006) documents that the companies that have higher levels of free cash flow tend to over-invest, which 
is consistent with the explanations for agency costs. Further, the study finds that certain governance structure, such 
as the presence of active shareholders, affects the level of over-investment. Biddle and Hilary (2006) expect that 
investment efficiency is associated with information asymmetry and test whether financial reporting quality affects 
the firm-level capital investment efficiency by reducing agency costs. The study provides evidence that higher 
accounting quality enhances investment efficiency after mitigating investment-cash flow sensitivity. In addition, 
McNichols and Stubben(2008) suggest a positive relationship between financial reporting quality and investment efficiency, 
using a sample of firms accused of accounting improprieties by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC), 
identifying the period for which the manipulation is alleged. The study documents that managers do not choose optimal 
investment levels because they might be misinformed about the true state of their firms or growth trends of the market 
through manipulated financial reports. Biddle et al. (2009) argue that higher quality financial reports increase investment 
efficiency after reducing information asymmetry between managers and outside suppliers of capital, which saves cost of 
capital and monitoring costs. Finally, Cheng et al. (2013) document that firms that have disclosed their ICW in 
financial reporting systems are expected to reduce investment inefficiency in the post-disclosure period. This is 
because the ICW informs investors of adverse public signals and thus mitigates information asymmetry between 
managers and outside investors. 
 
In summary, prior studies suggest that the company with high quality of financial reports can maintain an 
optimal level of investment by reducing information asymmetry between managers and outside capital providers (Verdi, 
2006; Biddle and Hilary, 2006; McNichols and Stubben, 2008; Biddle et al., 2009; Cheng et al., 2013). In addition, the 
agency problem caused by information asymmetry could be lower in private firms than in public firms because 
private companies are usually closely held and stockholders of these firms play an important role in management. 
This, in turn, reduces the information asymmetry after the investors get access to inside information for making 
investment decisions (Beatty and Harris, 1998; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Chen et al., 
2011). Accordingly, we expect that private firms make investment decisions differently than publicly traded companies 
owing to the different level of information asymmetry. Based on the discussion above, we hypothesize that the private 
firms invest more efficiently than publicly traded firms. We thus propose the following two hypotheses: 
 
H1a: Private firms invest more than public firms do when the likelihood of under-investment is high.  
 
H1b: Private firms invest less than public firms do when the likelihood of over-investment is high.  
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Measurement of Investment Efficiency 
 
We compare the investment efficiency of private and public firms conditional on whether the firm is more likely to 
over- or under-invest. Consistent with Biddle et al. (2009), we use ex-ante firm-specific characteristics, such as liquidity that 
may affect the likelihood of over- or under-investment. We measure firm liquidity using two variables including cash 
balance and firm leverage as proxies for investment efficiency. First, firms with large cash balances are more likely to relate 
to inefficient use of the excessive cash that can lead to over-investment. Second, firms with low leverage are less likely to 
suffer financing constraints, and more likely to accept the current investment project. On the contrary, firms with small cash 
balances or high leverage are more likely to reject the investment plan that can cause under-investment.  
 
The following model estimates whether private firms are negatively (or positively) related to investment efficiency 
when firms are more likely to over-invest (or under-invest) (firms subscripts are suppressed) (Biddle et al., 2009).   
 
                                                                        
                                                                                      
                                          (1) 
 
We estimate equation (1) using ordinary least square (OLS) regression after adjusting the standard errors for 
heteroskedasticity. The dependent variable Investment is the total investment measured as the sum of capital and R&D 
expenditure multiplied by 100 and scaled by the lagged PPE. ULIST is an indicator variable which is one for private firms 
and zero for public firms. Consistent with Biddle et al. (2009), we measure Investment in Year t+1, and our indicator/ 
interaction variables and control variables at the end of Year t. A variable OVER distinguishes between firm characteristics 
in which the firm is more likely to over- or under-invest. To measure OVER, we follow Biddle et al. (2009). First, we rank 
firms into deciles based on their cash to total asset ratio, and negative leverage at the end of Year t . Then, we average these 
two decile ranks and re-scale them to range from zero to one. In doing so, we can capture the likelihood of over-investment 
and increase the power of our analysis.  
 
We test hypotheses H1a and H1b by estimating equation (1) and focus on the indicator variable ULIST and the 
interaction variable OVER_ULIST. If OVER equals zero, then firms suffer financial constraints and thus, are more likely to 
under-invest. Hypothesis H1a predicts that private firms invest more than public firms do when the likelihood of under-
investment is high. We test this prediction by examining if the coefficient of ULIST is positive. On the other hand, if OVER 
equals one, then firms have the highest level of liquidity, and are more likely to over-invest. Hypothesis H1b predicts that 
private firms invest less than public firms do when the likelihood of over-investment is high. In this case, we test H1b 
by examining whether the sum of the coefficients (β1 +β2) of ULIST and OVER_ULIST is negative.  
 
Control variables are included in equation (1). We base our control variables on Biddle et al. (2009), except for 
variables related to the stock market and governance because they are not available in private firms. Thus, our variables to 
control for investment behavior of firms include firm size (SIZE), cash flow from operation (CFO), firm age (AGE), 
dividends indicator (DIV), loss indicator (LOSS), cash flow deflated by sales (CFOsales), the standard deviation of sales 
(stdSALES), the standard deviation of cash flow from operations (stdCFO), the standard deviation of investment (stdINV), 
operation cycle (OPC), tangibility (Tangibility), and industry leverage (INDlev). In addition, we consider the year dummies 
and industry dummies based on the two-digit Korean Standard Industry Codes. 
 
3.2 Propensity-Score Matching Model 
 
Private firms are substantially different from public firms in terms of unobservable innate characteristics as well 
as observable factors such as firm size, cash flow, and other factors that can influence the level of investment of the 
companies. To mitigate this concern, we employ the propensity-score matching model to control for unobservable 
differences in relevance dimension between private and public firms (Armstrong et al., 2010; Lawrence et al., 2011). 
Specifically, we estimate the propensity score in the first stage that includes all variables presenting determinants of 
investment in equation (2), as follows. 
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In equation (2), we use a logit model to estimate the probability of being a public firm group for estimating 
propensity scores (Lawrence et al. 2011). Since the macro-economic situation changes every year, we estimate the 
logit model by year. We then match, without replacement, the public and private firm groups that have the closest 
predicted value from equation (2) within a maximum distance of 1 percent. After applying this process, we obtain 
propensity-score matched samples of 9,084 firm-years, which are 4,542 pairs in each private and public firm group. 
Finally, in the second stage, we estimate the coefficients in equation (1) using this sample to test the hypotheses H1a 
and H1b. 
 
3.3 Sample Selection 
 
For our analysis, we use private and public firm-year data from 2004 to 2011. We restrict our test to this 
period because several control variables are missing in the earlier private firm-year samples. The financial data for 
private and public firms are collected from the KIS-VALUE database, which provides all audited Korean 
companies' financial reports. Consistent with prior studies, we exclude financial firms because the nature of 
investment for these firms differs from those of other firms. Therefore, we use nonfinancial firms with available data 
requiring at least 20 observations in each two-digit Korean Industry Classification Code grouping per year. After 
truncating extreme observations at the top and bottom 1 percent of all the variables in the model except indicator 
variables, in order to mitigate the influence of outliers, the sample size is reduced to 44,907 firm-year observations 
over the period. Finally, we use 9,084 firm- year samples after matching private and public firm-year samples 
according to the propensity-score matching process. 
 
4. EMPRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Univariate Test 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables in equation (1). Our sample contains 9,084 firm-
year observations, which include 4,542 private and public firms for the period 2004 to 2011. Columns 2 -5 of Table 
1 provide the mean, median and standard deviation for our dependent and control variables of full matched sample. 
On average, our sample firms invest about 38.69 percent of lagged PPE. The mean of firm size (SIZE) across all 
firm-years is 25.22, which is equal to about 171 million US dollars.  
 
Columns 6 -9 of Table 1 provide descriptive statistics of private firm observations, and columns 10 -13 of 
Table 1 provide the statistics of public firm observations. The mean of private firms’ Investment equals 34.21, which 
is smaller than the mean of public firms’ Investment at the one percent level. This implies that public firms, on 
average, invest more than private firms. On the contrary, the average firm size (SIZE) of private firms is bigger than 
that of public companies at the ten percent level, even though both are matched by propensity score using equation 
(2). In addition, the mean of firm age (AGE) and industry leverage (INDlev) between private and public firms is 
different from each other at one percent level and the five percent level, respectively. However, other variables do 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
(1)Variables 
Full sample (N=9,084) Private firms (N=4,542) Pubic firms (N=4,542) Private-Public firms 
(2)OBS (3)Mean (4)Median 
(5)Std. 
dev. 











Investment 9,084 38.685 15.506 84.128 4,542 34.206 13.752 73.610 4,542 43.164 17.180 93.264 -8.958 -5.080 *** 
SIZE 9,084 25.220 25.107 1.064 4,542 25.241 25.116 1.178 4,542 25.198 25.104 0.935 0.042 1.900* 
CFO 9,084 0.045 0.045 0.153 4,542 0.043 0.045 0.167 4,542 0.046 0.043 0.138 -0.003 -0.980 
AGE 9,084 3.094 3.135 0.559 4,542 3.108 3.135 0.535 4,542 3.081 3.135 0.581 0.027 2.320** 
DIV 9,084 0.519 1.000 0.500 4,542 0.526 1.000 0.499 4,542 0.512 1.000 0.500 0.013 1.280 
BIG 9,084 0.461 0.000 0.498 4,542 0.477 0.000 0.500 4,542 0.444 0.000 0.497 0.033 3.180*** 
LOSS 9,084 0.240 0.000 0.427 4,542 0.233 0.000 0.423 4,542 0.247 0.000 0.431 -0.014 -1.570 
CFOsale 9,084 0.024 0.046 0.503 4,542 0.019 0.048 0.580 4,542 0.029 0.043 0.413 -0.009 -0.900 
stdSALES 9,084 0.297 0.210 0.286 4,542 0.299 0.216 0.282 4,542 0.295 0.204 0.290 0.005 0.810 
stdCFO 9,084 0.085 0.069 0.068 4,542 0.086 0.070 0.068 4,542 0.085 0.069 0.068 0.001 0.790 
stdINV 9,084 6.463 3.788 11.654 4,542 6.494 3.592 13.801 4,542 6.432 3.988 9.010 0.063 0.260 
OPC 9,084 4.722 4.766 0.793 4,542 4.718 4.757 0.854 4,542 4.725 4.779 0.726 -0.007 -0.420 
Tangibility 9,084 0.303 0.283 0.195 4,542 0.302 0.276 0.205 4,542 0.303 0.290 0.186 -0.001 -0.310 
INDlev 9,084 0.527 0.523 0.061 4,542 0.529 0.524 0.063 4,542 0.524 0.520 0.060 0.006 4.390*** 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the sample (9,084 firm-year observations) including the listed firms on the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI), the 
Korea Securities Dealer Automated Quotation (KOSDAQ) market, Korea New Exchange (KONEX) market and private firms over the period 2004 to 2011. See the Appendix for variable 
definitions. 
 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix (N=9,084) 
Variables Investment Ulist OVER SIZE CFO AGE DIV LOSS CFOsale stdSALES stdCFO stdINV OPC Tangibility INDlev 
Investment 
 
-0.05 0.13 -0.10 0.04 -0.17 -0.05 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.14 0.03 0.01 -0.33 -0.04 
Ulist -0.09 
 
-0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 
OVER 0.14 -0.02 
 
-0.21 0.22 -0.06 0.21 -0.20 0.10 -0.02 0.00 -0.10 -0.06 -0.28 -0.16 
SIZE -0.07 0.00 -0.21 
 
0.08 0.08 0.12 -0.18 0.03 -0.06 -0.12 -0.05 -0.11 0.11 0.15 
CFO 0.17 0.02 0.28 0.11 
 
-0.01 0.25 -0.29 0.56 -0.05 -0.12 -0.01 -0.19 0.08 -0.04 
AGE -0.27 0.02 -0.08 0.13 -0.05 
 
0.11 -0.08 0.02 -0.26 -0.20 -0.15 -0.03 0.13 0.02 
DIV 0.05 0.01 0.20 0.13 0.32 0.11 
 
-0.48 0.12 -0.05 -0.13 -0.08 -0.08 0.01 -0.02 
LOSS -0.10 -0.02 -0.20 -0.18 -0.37 -0.08 -0.48 
 
-0.16 0.03 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.03 
CFOsales 0.10 0.03 0.31 0.12 0.91 -0.03 0.28 -0.35 
 
-0.07 -0.11 -0.04 -0.15 0.05 -0.03 
stdSALES 0.15 0.01 -0.05 -0.11 -0.03 -0.31 -0.09 0.05 -0.11 
 
0.27 0.10 -0.12 -0.12 0.07 
stdCFO 0.16 0.01 0.00 -0.15 -0.07 -0.24 -0.15 0.12 -0.13 0.37 
 
0.15 0.02 -0.17 0.04 
stdINV 0.19 -0.06 -0.12 -0.10 0.06 -0.17 -0.05 0.06 0.03 0.13 0.13 
 
-0.03 0.18 0.06 
OPC 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.13 -0.21 -0.02 -0.07 0.05 -0.14 -0.14 0.00 -0.05 
 
-0.13 -0.23 
Tangibility -0.35 -0.02 -0.26 0.09 0.09 0.16 0.03 0.03 0.10 -0.15 -0.21 0.31 -0.12 
 
0.07 
INDlev -0.10 0.04 -0.14 0.17 -0.06 0.06 0.00 0.01 -0.07 0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.23 0.01 
 
This table presents Pearson (Spearman) correlations above (below) the diagonal for variables. Coefficients shown in bold are significant at p < 0.05 (two-tailed test). See the Appendix for variable 
definitions. 
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Table 2 provides the correlations among dependent and control variables. Our indicator variable, ULIST 
(OVER) is negatively (positively), and significantly related to Investment. However, as described below, ULIST is 
related to Investment conditionally on the firms’ liquidity level, which represents their propensity to over- or under-
investment. Firm age (AGE) and cash flow (CFOsales) are significantly related to firms' investment decision 
(Investment). On the other hand, other control variables are not likely to be significantly related to Investment. The 
liquidity level of companies (OVER) is related to several control variables such as firm age (AGE), dividends (DIV), 
loss (LOSS), cash flow (CFOsales) and other firm characteristics.  
 
4.2 Multivariate Results 
 
Table 3 provides the main results for our conditional tests of hypotheses H1a and H1b. The dependent variable is 
Investment. The results are based on the propensity-score matched sample in Year t. The coefficient of private firms 
(ULIST) is +12.756 at the significant one percent level. This suggests that private firms invest significantly more 
than public firms do when the likelihood of under-investment is high. This result is consistent with hypothesis (H1a). 
 
Table 3. Conditional relation between investment and private firms 
(1) Variables (2) Predicted Sign (3) Coefficient (4) t-value 
ULIST +/- 12.756 4.14*** 
OVER_ULIST +/- -41.561 -6.15*** 
OVER +/- 28.235 4.78*** 
SIZE - -3.390 -3.84*** 
CFO + 47.170 6.12*** 
AGE - -13.590 -8.98*** 
DIV - -4.370 -2.33** 
LOSS - 4.296 1.68* 
CFOsale + -1.673 -0.85 
stdSALES - -8.757 -2.68*** 
stdCFO + 65.793 3.45*** 
stdINV + 0.424 4.23*** 
OPC - -1.971 -1.12 
Tangibility - -131.943 -21.94*** 
INDlev - -84.130 -3.01*** 
Fixed Effect  Year and Industry 
Observations 9,084 





Joint significance  
(ULIST+OVER_ULIST)  
-28.805 66.59*** 
This table presents the regression estimates of the model that examines the relation between private firms (ULIST) and total investment 
(Investment) based on the propensity-score matched sample. The model includes year and industry fixed effects based on the two-digit 
Korean Standard Industry Codes. T-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels respectively, based on two-tailed test. See the Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
The coefficient of interaction variables (OVER_ULIST) is -41.561 and is significantly negative at the one 
percent level. This result means that private firms are more likely to decrease incremental investment when the firms' 
liquidity level is increasing. To test hypothesis (H1b), as discussed before, we are interested in the sum of the coefficients of 
private firms (ULIST), and the interaction between private firms and liquidity level (OVER_ULIST). Our results show that 
the sum of β1 and β2 is -28.805, and is significantly negative at the one percent level. These findings are consistent with 
hypothesis (H1b), suggesting that private firms invest significantly less than public firms do when the likelihood of 
over-investment is high.  
 
Results for the control variables are generally consistent with previous studies, such as Biddle et al. (2009) 
and Cheng et al. (2013). First, firm size (SIZE) is negatively related to investment (Investment) at the one percent 
level because the investment opportunity of big companies is relatively less than that of small companies, which are 
more likely to try to find new growth opportunities. Cash flow is the most important determinant to decide the 
investment. Thus, cash flow from operations (CFO), and the volatility of cash flow (stdCFO) are positively 
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associated with the dependent variable (Investment) at the one percent level. Firm age (AGE) is negatively related to 
investment (Investment) because young companies apparently find new investment opportunities rather than old 
companies. Further, dividends (DIV) and tangibility (Tangibility) exhibit a negative relationship with investment 
(Investment), which corresponds to the results obtained by Biddle et al. (2009), and Cheng et al. (2013). 
 
Overall, our results show that the investment efficiency of private firms is higher than that of public firms, 
supporting both H1a and H1b. It implies that information asymmetry can be mitigated in private firms, because 
investors play an important role in the management of these firms and have more access to internal information than 
in public companies. 
 
4.3 Additional Analyses 
 
4.3.1 Capital Expenditures and Non-Capital Expenditures 
 
We analyze the investment efficiency of private and public firms in the partitioned liquidity situation as 
described in Table 3. As discussed before, we include both capital and non-capital expenditures when we calculate 
total investment. This measure of investment follows Biddle et al. (2009), and Richardson (2006). In order to check 
for robustness, we decompose the total investment into two components (Biddle et al., 2009; Cheng et al., 2013). 
Table 4 provides the results after the dependent variable Investment is decomposed into two components, Capex and 
Non-Capex, as alternative dependent variables. We compute Capex as current capital expenditures scaled by lagged 
PPE and multiplied by 100, while Non-Capex is computed as current R&D expenditures scaled by lagged PPE, and 
multiplied by 100. We re-test our main hypotheses using these two proxies. 
 
Results reported in Table 4 show that our main hypotheses are not affected by the decision to use either 
Capex or Non-Capex as the dependent variable. Columns 2 -3 of Table 4 provide the estimated coefficients when the 
dependent variable is Capex, and columns 4 -5 of Table 4 represent the results in case of Non-Capex. The main 
effects of private firms (ULIST) on the Capex and Non-Capex are positive and significant at the five percent level 
and the one percent level, respectively (the t-statistics equal 2.01 and 3.41, respectively). Our results show that 
private firms incur more capital as well as R&D expenditures than public firms do when the likelihood of under-
investment is high. These results provide robust evidence to support hypothesis (H1a). 
 
Furthermore, the interaction terms (OVER_ULIST) between ULIST and OVER are negative and 
significant at the one percent level (with t-statistics of -3.84 and -4.52, respectively). These are substantially 
consistent with the results in Table 3. In addition, the sum of the coefficients (β1+ β2) of ULIST and on the 
interaction(OVER_ULIST) between ULIST and OVER is -15.184 and -5.512 at the one percent level, respectively. These 
results also suggest that when the likelihood of over-investment is high, the private firms incur significantly less 
capital as well as non-capital expenditures than public firms do. These findings are consistent with hypothesis (H1b). 
The coefficients of control variables show substantially the same results as in Table 4, even though the significance 
of several control variables in columns 4 -5 disappears.  
 
Overall, even when we use either capital expenditure (or non-capital expenditure) as the dependent 
variable, our results show that investment efficiency of private firms is higher than that of public firms. These results 
are consistent with our main results as reported in Table 3.  
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ULIST  4.834  2.01** 3.009  3.41*** 
OVER_ULIST -20.019  -3.84*** -8.521  -4.52*** 
OVER 14.264  3.17*** 6.396  4.07*** 
SIZE -3.343  -5.57*** -0.365  -1.48  
CFO 38.437  6.55*** 3.696  1.23  
AGE -9.858  -8.24*** -3.525  -7.64*** 
DIV -3.992  -3.08*** -0.602  -1.12  
LOSS 0.811  0.47  1.078  1.64  
CFOsale -1.531  -1.07  0.071  0.15  
stdSALES -2.333  -1.08  -1.500  -1.81  
stdCFO 18.158  1.50  11.073  2.53** 
stdINV 0.421  4.54*** 0.000  0.03  
OPC -1.925  -1.75  0.486  1.49  
Tangibility -88.579  -21.35*** -25.993  -17.00*** 
INDlev -48.355  -2.41*** -28.433  -3.84*** 
Fixed Effect Year and Industry Year and Industry 
Observations 9,084 9,084 
adj R-square 0.154 0.126 
F-value 32.79*** 25.93*** 
F-test : Coefficient F-value Coefficient F-value 
Joint significance  
(ULIST+OVER_ULIST) 
-15.184 9.38*** -5.512 32.99*** 
This table presents the regression estimates of the model that examines the relation between private firms (ULIST) and Capex (Non-Capex) 
investment based on the propensity-score matched sample. Columns 2 -3 provide the estimated coefficients when the dependent 
variable is Capex, and columns 4 -5 represent the estimated coefficients when the dependent variable is Non-Capex. The model 
includes year and industry fixed effects based on based on the two-digit Korean Standard Industry Codes. T-statistics are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively, based on two-tailed test. See the 
Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
4.3.2 Partitioning Variables at the Aggregate and Industry Levels as a Proxy for Over 
 
Biddle et al. (2009) propose exogenous firm-specific proxies to measure the likelihood of over- or under-
investment, instead of measures based on cash (or leverage) (OVER). They use investment aggregated at the 
economy and industry levels because aggregate investment is less likely to be affected by firm specific 
characteristics that cause endogenous problems in the regression equation (1). Following Biddle et al. (2009), we use 
the new proxies of aggregated invest measures to provide robust evidence of our previous results. In addition, we 
estimate the likelihood of over- or under-investment measure based on the industry aggregated level (OverIndustry), 
and overall economy aggregated level (OverAggregate) using equation (3). 
 
              =                                                                      (3) 
 
To measure OverIndustry, we estimate β1 in equation (3) using the average Investment and average 
SalesGrowth for all industries with at least 20 observations in each two-digit Korean Industry Classification Code 
grouping per year. Then we rank the estimated residuals from equation (3) into deciles, which are re-scaled from 
zero to one. Finally, we re-estimate equation (1) using new measures as OverIndustry instead of OVER. In addition, 
we use the average Investment and average SalesGrowth in the overall economy to estimate residual from equation 
(3) in a given year. Then, we rank the residuals into deciles, and use the deciles as the proxy for aggregated 
likelihood of over-investment in each year, OverAggregate. 
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Table 5. Aggregate over-investment partitions. 
Variables 
(1) 









ULIST  3.446 1.74* 10.866 4.30*** 
OVER_ULIST -15.029 -2.39** -23.993 -3.47*** 
OVER 151.865 28.16*** 145.269 29.04*** 
SIZE -2.695 -3.53*** -3.854 -4.73*** 
CFO 23.246 3.82*** 19.590 3.08*** 
AGE -5.701 -4.52*** -4.800 -3.42*** 
DIV -7.605 -4.64*** -8.905 -5.15*** 
LOSS 3.152 1.47 6.574 2.81*** 
CFOsale -1.620 -1.17 0.051 0.04 
stdSALES -11.634 -4.25*** -8.993 -3.42*** 
stdCFO 38.087 2.35** 48.205 3.00*** 
stdINV 0.253 3.85*** 0.130 2.60*** 
OPC -2.072 -1.38 -1.475 -1.14 
Tangibility -70.121 -18.46*** -63.400 -16.42*** 
INDlev -357.188 -13.09*** -48.888 -1.96** 
Fixed Effect Year and Industry Year and Industry 
Observations 9,084 9,470 
adj R-square 0.392 0.321 
F-value 117.98*** 88.80*** 
F-test : Coefficient F-value Coefficient F-value 
Joint significance  
(ULIST+OVER_ULIST) 
-11.582 19.72*** -13.127 23.02*** 
This table presents the regression estimates of the model that examines the relation between private firms (ULIST) and total investment 
(Investment) based on the propensity-score matched sample. Columns 2-3 provide the estimated coefficients using industry 
partitioning and columns 4-5 represent the estimated coefficients using aggregate economy partitioning. The model includes year 
and industry fixed effects based on based on two-digit Korean Standard Industry Codes. T-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively, based on two-tailed test. See the Appendix for 
variable definitions. 
 
Results reported in Table 5 show that our main hypotheses are not substantially changed after using 
alternative proxies for the likelihood of over- or under-investment measures. Columns 2 -3 of Table 5 provide the 
estimated coefficients using the industry partitioning and columns 4 -5 of Table 5 represent results using aggregate 
economy partitioning. The coefficients of ULIST are significantly positive at the ten percent level and the one 
percent level, respectively (the t-statistics equal 1.74 and 4.30, respectively). These results provide additional 
evidence on hypothesis H1a that private firms usually increase investment more than public firms when the liquidity 
condition measured using alternative aggregated proxy is the worst. In addition, the coefficients of the interaction 
terms (OVER_ULIST) between ULIST and OVER are significantly negative at the five percent level and the one 
percent level, respectively (with t-statistics of -2.39 and -3.47, respectively). The sum of the coefficients of ULIST and 
OVER_ULIST is -11.582 and -13.127 at the one percent level, respectively. These results also provide robust evidence for 
hypothesis H1b that the private firms invest less than public firms do when the likelihood of over-investment is high. 
Additionally, these findings suggest that private firms are less likely to be affected by overall economy shocks in 
investment decision than public firms are. 
 
4.3.3 Financial Reporting Quality Measures 
 
Previous studies document that higher financial reporting quality increases the investment efficiency by 
reducing information asymmetry between managers and outside investors (Verdi, 2006). Moreover, private and public 
firms usually provide different qualities of financial reports due to different market demand (Beatty, 2002). According to 
related studies, financial reporting quality of private or public companies can affect our main results for investment 
efficiency. To mitigate this concern, we include financial reporting quality proxies in equation (1).  
 
We use two proxies to control for financial reporting quality. First, we add the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals commonly used to examine financial reporting quality literature. We estimate a cross-
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sectional variant of the Jones (1991) model modified by Dechow et al. (1995). Second, we also use earnings quality 
measure, modified by Francis et al (2005). The model proposed by Dechow and Dichev(2002), and Francis et al. 
(2005) include changes in sales and PPE.  
 
Table 6 reports the results for equation (1) after including financial reporting quality proxies. Columns 2 -
3 of Table 6 provide the results using the modified Jones model and columns 4 -5 of Table 6 show the results using 
earnings quality measure. Our results show that the sign of ULIST is significantly positive for both measures (with t-
statistics of 4.27 and 3.94, respectively). Further, the sum of the coefficients of ULIST and OVER_ULIST is -28.538 
and -27.362 at the one percent level, respectively. These results, which strongly support hypothesis H1a and H1b, show 




Earlier studies document that the investment efficiency of firms can change according to the companies' 
agency problems caused by information asymmetry between managers and outside investors. Moreover, private and 
public firms have different levels of information asymmetry because the former are more closely managed by 
shareholders and their major investors have access to internal information of the companies. We extend these studies 
by comparing the investment efficiency of private and public firms using an extended audited financial dataset of 
Korean firms. We hypothesize that the private firms invest more efficiently than public firms.  
 
Our results support the hypothesis that the investment efficiency of private firms is higher than that of 
public firms because the agency problem caused by information asymmetry of private firms is lower than that of 
public firms. Robustness checks show that private firms invest more efficiently in R&D and capital expenditures 
than public firms. Further, we use alternative exogenous firm-specific proxies to measure the likelihood of over or 
under-investment following Biddle et al.(2009). The results are consistent with the main results that private firms are 
less likely to invest when liquidity is high, as measured by alternative aggregate proxies, and more likely to invest 
when the likelihood of over-investment is low. Finally, based on the literature documenting that private and public 
companies have different levels of financial reporting quality, which can affect investment efficiency, we re-test our 
hypotheses by including financial reporting quality proxies as control variables in the main regression model. These 
investigations further support our main results.  
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Table 6. Results after controlling for Accounting Quality 
Variables 
(1) 









ULIST 13.082 4.27*** 12.818 3.94*** 
OVER_ULIST -41.620 -6.19*** -42.724 -5.81*** 
OVER 25.752 4.07*** 24.060 3.53*** 
ABSDA 6.412 0.46 
  








SIZE -3.403 -3.85*** -3.401 -3.76*** 
CFO 50.902 6.12*** 43.877 5.48*** 
AGE -13.441 -8.89*** -13.198 -8.31*** 
DIV -4.254 -2.26** -5.216 -2.75*** 
LOSS 4.085 1.61 2.051 0.80 
CFOsale -1.096 -0.51 -0.604 -0.25 
stdSALES -8.986 -2.74*** -7.094 -2.08** 
stdCFO 56.867 2.98*** 63.861 3.23*** 
stdINV 0.414 4.19*** 0.371 4.16*** 
OPC -1.823 -1.04 -1.565 -0.94 
Tangibility -130.311 -21.76*** -125.731 -20.77*** 
INDlev -85.932 -3.02*** -77.997 -2.57*** 
Fixed Effect Year and Industry Year and Industry 
Observations 9,084 7,556 
adj R-square 0.158 0.173 
F-value 33.8*** 30.8*** 
F-test : Coefficient F-value Coefficient F-value 
Joint significance  
(ULIST+OVER_ULIST) 
-28.538 65.31*** -27.362 66.34*** 
This table presents the regression estimates of the model that examines the relation between private firms (ULIST) and total investment 
(Investment) based on the propensity-score matched sample. Columns 2 -3 provide the estimated coefficients using modified Jones 
model(Dechow et al., 1995) and columns 4 -5 represent the estimated coefficients using earnings quality measure (Francis et 
al.,2005). The model includes year and industry fixed effects based on based on two-digit Korean Standard Industry Codes. T-statistics 
are corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * denote statistical significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively, based on two-
tailed test. See the Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
This paper contributes to the literature on the important differences between private and public firms by 
showing that the investment efficiency of private firms is different from that of public firms. Prior studies document 
that private equity and public equity firms have different characteristics, such as financial reports quality, using a 
limited firm-year sample (Givoly et al., 2010; Beatty et al., 2002). This study provides additional evidence on the 
differences between private and public firms by comparing the investment behavior of privately held firms with that 
of public firms using large audited financial data of Korean firms. Additionally, this study focuses on agency 
perspectives such as information asymmetry, which plays an important role in determining the level of investment 
efficiency. Earlier studies document that financial reporting quality reduces agency costs, leading to an increase in 
investment efficiency (Cheng et al., 2013). This study provides additional evidence on the agency problem, which 
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Dependent Variables 
Investment = the sum of R&D expenditures and capital expenditure multiplied by 100 and scaled by 
lagged PPE. 
Capex = capital expenditures multiplied by 100 and scaled by lagged PPE. 
Non-Capex = R&D expenditures multiplied by 100 and scaled by lagged PPE.  
 
Ownership structure variables 
ULIST = an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is a private firm, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Over-investment proxies 
OVER =  a ranked variable based on the average rank of a ranked (re-scaled from zero to one 
deciles) measure of cash and leverage, as in Biddle et al.(2009). Leverage is multiplied by 
minus one before ranking so that both variables are increasing in the likelihood of  
OverIndustry = over-investment. 
a ranked variable based on the unexplained industry-year investment, as in Biddle et 
al.(2009). Specifically, in each industry-year we measure aggregate investment and 
regress industry-year investment on industry-year sales growth. We then rank the  
OverAggregate = residual from this model into deciles and re-scale from zero to one.  
a ranked variable based on the unexplained aggregate investment rate for all firms in the 
economy, as in Biddle et al.(2009). Specifically, in each year we measure the average 
investment in the economy and regress aggregate investment on aggregate sales growth. 
We then rank the residual from this model into deciles and re-scale from zero to one. 
 
Financial reporting quality 
ABSDA  = the absolute value of residuals from the modified Jones model(Dechow et al., 1995). 
DD = the absolute value of residuals from the modified Dechow and Dichev(2002) 
model(Francis et al., 2005). 
 
Control variables 
AGE = the natural log of firm age. 
CFO = the cash flow from operations deflated by current total assets. 
CFOsale = the ratio of CFO to sales. 
DIV  = an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm paid a dividend, and 0 otherwise.  
INDlev = the average leverage for industries.  
LOSS = an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if net income is negative, and 0 otherwise. 
the natural log of receivables to sales plus inventory to COGS multiplied by 360. 
OPC = changes in sales scaled by lagged sales. 
SalesGrowth = the natural log of total assets. 
SIZE stdCFO = standard deviation of the cash flow from operations deflated by average total assets from 
t-4 to t. 
stdINVEST = standard deviation of the investment deflated by average total assets from t-4 to t, the 
investment is defined by the sum of R&D expenditures and PPE multiplied by 100 and 
scaled by lagged total assets.  
stdSALES = standard deviation of the sales deflated by average total assets from t-4 to t.  
Tangibility = the ratio of PPE to total assets. 
 
 
